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Introduction
The global financial and economic crisis (the Great Recession) showed that macroeconomists and central banks know less than they previously believed they knew, thus questioning the theoretical fundamentals of economic policy (Krugman, 2008) . Romer (2011) clearly pointed to several segments with fragile postulates serving as basis for the macroeconomic policy framework: They thought that macroeconomic fluctuations were under control; they thought that the zero lower bound nominal interest rate presented none or only a minimal problem; they did not pay much attention to financial regulation and to financial disturbances of the macroeconomics; the idea that economic policy creators would tolerate a period (several years) of substantially increased unemployment rate became reality; the leading new Keynesian models (DSGE) were of little help. The global crisis disproved the widespread belief that large economic downfalls can be overcome only with monetary policy tools and fiscal policy once again became interesting and important (see Krugman, 2009 ).
The analysis of the lessons from the Great Recession and their implications on macroeconomic policies is complex and requires a thorough knowledge of the problems and causes for the crisisglobal imbalances, loose monetary policy, the new financial architecture and relations, inadequate regulation and supervision, real estate bubbles. Many studies analyze the lessons learned from the recent global economic crisis, as well as the lessons from previous crises, trying to reach valuable conclusions that can help economic theory and policy in the future. However, most of the studies focus on one element, meaning on certain problems of economic theory or certain issues and elements/effects of economic policy, with empirical studies being generally more specialized than theoretical or analytical studies. For example, Bernanke (2010) reviews four lessons from the crisis: first -economic prosperity largely depends on financial stability and the health of the financial system; second -policy creators should respond strongly, creatively and determinedly in order to efficiently handle severe economic crises; third -global crises require an international policy response -the global economy and the financial systems will sink or sail/swim together; fourthparticularly important, history is never the prefect guide, which can be best seen in the words of Mark Twain "History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme". Blanchard et al. (2010) discuss the reassessment of economic policy and find some key points: a stable inflation may be necessary, but it is not sufficient; low inflation limits the scope for monetary policy in terms of deflationary recessions; financial intermediation is of special importance; countercyclical fiscal policy is an important tool during crises; regulation is not macro-economically neutral; there is a need for reinterpretation of the "Great moderation". Another type of analysis using soft concepts and measures аre especially interesting because usually are exploratory in nature and intend to provoke further research in area of interest. In this regard especially interesting is the research by Dana (1993) which elaborates what should be the extent and nature of governmental intervention in the economic sphere to achieve and create an environment conducive to entrepreneurship. The structure and purpose of this kind of research also could be foundation for future development of studies regarding lessons learned from certain crisis or economic changes, because these studies make attempt to give answer to research theses based on field research in a country, region, or beyond (see Dana, 1993, Kaynak and Dana, 2013) .
The paper has a quite wide area of research, trying to tackle many problems faced by key economic policies and to create a redesigned macroeconomic policy framework. To our best knowledge, the economic literature is not very rich in this type of studies. This research is an attempt to fill the gap in the economic literature by summarizing all the dilemmas, practices and lessons concerning the area of designing fiscal and monetary policies during global economic crises. Thus the focus and research goals of this paper are widely set in line with the issues and dilemmas concerning the design of the key macroeconomic policies, their mutual interactions, as well as their effects on the macroeconomic environment in terms of crises. Having in mind the responses of the fiscal and monetary policy in the period before and during the global economic crisis we are specifically interested in the following questions/hypothesis:: what have we learned from the global economic crisis; is there a need for redesigning the existing framework of the key macroeconomic policies; is there a need to obtain a more efficient way to handle future economic crises; what are key elements of monetary/fiscal policy that should be modified.
Having this in mind, the rest of the paper is structured in five sections. The next section highlights the key challenges and dilemmas that the global economic crisis of 2008 imposed on economic theory and economic policy. The third and fourth sections are central in this study. They analyze the key lessons (also dilemmas) from the global crisis for fiscal and monetary policy and how these lessons reflect on the existing macroeconomic postulates. Based on the lessons learned from the recent global economic crisis about the need for active economic policy, its effectiveness and consequences, the fifth section finally provides a new, redesigned framework of the key macroeconomic policies. In the end, the conclusion offers some possible ways for economic policy and theory to take at the crossroad that they have reached.
Methodology
This paper provides a critical analysis of the available relevant theoretical and empirical literature and summarize in one place dilemmas, practices and lessons concerning the area of designing fiscal and monetary policies in terms of the recent global economic crises. We have in mind that the most of the studies in this area of research focus on one element, meaning they usually focuses on certain problems of economic theory or certain issues and elements/effects of economic policy, with empirical studies being generally more specialized than theoretical or analytical studies. Also these types of analyses that include the interrelations and research of different economic policy aspects in one place and try to determine the need to revise the economic concepts, usually is very difficult to rely on empirical data and analyzes that would lead to concrete conclusions, without the research reaching the size of several books. For these reasons, in such analyzes, the available data/information and the results of the numerous empirical studies (closely related to the focus of our research) are elaborated, synthesized and analyzed. The collection, systematization and analysis of the available data, as well as the interpretation of the results from empirical research are based on logical, consistent and scientifically based approach.
The results of the research have been expressed in a clear and understandable way and in relative agreement with the previously established knowledge. Тhe type and structure of this paper requires using a combination of research methods to examine the various aspects that are being analyzed. In the preparation of the paper, the focus was on the basic research methods: The method of comparative analysis was applied in order to analyze the different attitudes/positions related to the responses of the key economic policies (fiscal and monetary) on the various challenges as a result of the global crisis. The methods of induction and deduction are used in the sections where we make conclusions about the challenges and effects which the global economic crisis had on economic theory and policy, also in order to breakdown the elements of the economic policy response on the global crisis etc. Using the methods of analysis and synthesis, the available knowledge/data on the lessons learned by the economic policy for overcoming the global crisis have being analyzed, unified and systematized.
Relevant literature -The global economic crisis as a challenge to economic theory and policy
Times of crisis are a challenge for economic science, such as wars are a challenge for army officers.
The recent crisis is a time when the economic profession should justify its existence and prove that its analyses and models can be useful. Various interpretations can be found concerning its responsibility (Manic, 2009; Trenovski, 2013; . Three main remarks can go on the account of economists and their role in the recent crisis (see Krugman, 2011) : failure to anticipate the emergence of the crisis; failure to even see the possibility for an emergence of such a crisis, leading to its fast spreading; failure to offer a useful advice on what to do once the crisis emerged, but instead offering only mixed voices, without a concrete guide for economic policy. It is not fair to blame economists for the first remark, however the second remark is more important, since any economist that remembers the history would know that financial crises are far from over, while the most catastrophic failure of economists is to offer principles and measures for guiding economic policy during the crisis. Other authors focus on the methodology and concrete research by present day economists. The non-defining of the most important economic problems in modern economies, the failure to locate and present the limitations and assumptions of popular models of the dominant paradigms, as well as the failure to provide timely warnings and concrete measures, all suggest a responsibility of the economic profession for the global economic crisis and the need for large changes and redefinitions in these fields (see Colander et al., 2009; Lawson, 2009 ).
The post-crisis economic literature if full of comparisons of the Great Recession with the Great Depression and the terms "biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression", "the biggest economic depression repeats", "we have not learned the lessons from the Great Depression" are used in economic debates and terminology. This triggered many papers that analyze and compare the Great Depression and the Great Recession and also find the main lessons that should not be forgotten and should provide guidance for policy creators in the future (Cecchetti 1997 , Cukierman, 2009 , Romer, 2009 Economists forgot once again that each economic crisis has its own specifics and hence the Global economic crisis left economic crisis confused once again. It took some time for economists to reach for the measures that relate to history, the Great Depression and Keynes (see Mărginean and Creţu, 2011; Praščević, 2009) . The debate about the neglected role of the state in society and economy and about the necessary approach for balancing the state and the market is revived. Nevertheless, the other extreme and consequences of undertaken measures are also pointed (over borrowing, inefficient allocation of money, increased protectionism and regulation etc.), (Schneider and Kirchgässner, 2009 ).
Before the global economic crisis, there was a widespread agreement among economists that shortterm economic stabilization should be in the hands of monetary authorities, mostly because of one of these reasons: skepticism surrounding the effects of fiscal policies based on the Ricardian equivalence arguments; if the monetary policy provides output stability, where is the role for fiscal policy?; the long lags in fiscal policy implementation and the political restrictions (Delong and Tyson, 2013) . This crisis caused, on one hand, the discovery of monetary policy limits, its redesign through implementation of various unconventional measures, and on the other hand, an increased significance of expansionary fiscal policies, especially in economies with sufficient fiscal space, and their role in stimulating economic activity, since the long duration of the crisis gives enough time for fiscal policy to achieve its goals (see more details in Blanchard The global financial and economic crisis also has point out the lack of an analytical framework that can help in predicting and dealing with emerging global financial imbalances, showing that they can cause serious macroeconomic consequences. If we make a retrospective, we can detect some fundamental flaws in the understanding of systematic risk. In fact, it is a failure to assess how aggressive risk taking by different types of financial institutions -against the background of robust macroeconomic performance and low interest rates -was a cause for huge growth in balances across financial systems.
Excessive confidence in the self-adjustment ability of the financial system led to an underestimation of the growing value of debt and leverage, resulting from the credit boom and the rise in the prices of assets (especially real estate) -reflected in the historically lowest level of volatility in prices of assets and risk premium. In addition, there was an insufficient understanding and considering of the role of financial innovation and regulation in the creation of the financial boom, financial imbalances and strong consequences for the real economy (see Galati and Moessner, 2011 ) .
Although the traditional economic theory offered some advice on how to conduct active economic policy in terms of the Global economic crisis, we cannot deny the fact that economic science failed to quickly and efficiently deal with the crisis and hence disappointed the public. On the other hand, as the practice confirmed, the economic approach is flexible enough to face the occurring problems, and thus we don"t need new economics, but we should use all available measures and tools (considering the past and present economic instruments) to solve the current problems (see more Schneider and Kirchgässner, 2009).
Lessons learned for monetary policy
The Global economic crisis showed the importance and risks that can arise from the financial sector for economic activity and for macroeconomic policy. The zero bound interest rate proved to be a more serious problem and limitation for monetary policy than previously thought. The costs of the burst of the financial bubble triggered the debate about proactive monetary policy during crisis vs. "cleaning" after the crisis. These and many other challenges started a debate about the need for redesigning the framework for monetary policy after the crisis in order to increase its efficiency and to maintain its function and goal. Mishkin (2010) , reviewing monetary policy strategies and the learned lessons, concludes that all the basic principles of monetary policy which were relevant before the crisis remain valid, but the importance of the principle that financial disagreements play an important role in the economic cycles is higher than anticipated by central banks before the crisis. The authors here would add: "the devil is in the details", i.e. although the basic principles of monetary policy in essence remain relevant, the changed financial and economic environment requires their further specification, defining, and there is a special need to question whether they are sufficient or there is room for their complementation with some new principles that would arise from the lessons from the global crisis.
1)
The "Lean vs. Clean" monetary policy dilemma (see more Mishkin, 2010; White, 2010;
Furceri and Mourougane, 2009), referring to whether monetary policy should act during potential threats from creation of bubbles -assets price growth. The global economic crisis taught us that a burst of a bubble created by high credit growth and financial imbalances, besides causing large costs, makes "cleaning" the financial and economic consequences very difficult. Therefore, we can expand this debate with the lesson that the costs for "cleaning" after a financial crisis are extremely large.
In addition to large output losses, caused by the global recession, the financial crisis causes additional costs: financial crises are usually followed by a very slow growth, countries" fiscal positions have substantially worsened; central banks" exit strategy could be very complicated and could endanger the successful and credible functioning of central banks in the future. According to this, the importance of monetary policy in the response to potential threats is larger than "cleaning" after the materialization of the threat. If the debate is aimed at the possibility for monetary policy to react to potential threats, the next logical question would be: how to do that? We have on one hand macroprudential policies and regulations, whereas on the other hand we have the influence of monetary policy on the creation of credit bubbles "risk taking channel of monetary policy" (Tobias and Shin, 2010). Having in mind the confirmation that monetary policy impacts risk taking, does this mean that it should be used for preventing bubbles? There are also strong arguments against it -most generally, that would mean breaking the old rule -an instrument can be used for two purposes:
stabilizing the financial sector and stabilizing the economy. Besides, there is another instrument available (macroprudential policies) for stabilizing the financial sector. The different aspects of this debate show that the decision to use monetary policy for prevention of bubbles is not easy to make. This points to the existence of a "trade-off" in monetary policy between financial stability and price and output stability. Giving another goal for monetary policy could lead to confusion about the dedication of the central bank to price stability, thus weakening the nominal anchor, causing potential adverse effects on the economy.
2)
Speculative bubbles are difficult to identify ahead with certainty -The Global economic crisis proved that, despite the obvious inconsistencies and risks in the financial sector, the rapidly growing real estate (and the whole financial sector) bubble was difficult to detect. In the period of the creation of the bubble, the policy creators were relaxed that the observed variables and parameters were within normal limits (inflation rate, growth rate and many financial variables that were considered relevant). Some studies show that it is easier to determine credit bubbles than asset price bubbles (including credit-driven bubbles and bubbles of irrational enthusiasm), hence the higher importance of these bubbles for monetary policy (White, 2009; Mishkin, 2010) . Thus, one of the key lessons for monetary policy creators is the creation of mechanism and instruments for detecting and signaling a development of credit bubbles -high credit growth, rising leverage, low risk margins, analysis of credit standards and policies etc. The analysis of potentially unsustainable credit and leverage growth is complex and requires accounting for corporations, households and financial (see more Caruana, 2009; Blanchard, 2009 ). The monitoring of credit markets and the markets of other financial instruments and intermediaries will become a particularly important activity. Thus, research in this field and reforms in this direction will be of special importance in the future.
3)
The influence of monetary policy (low reference interest rates) on risk taking (see more low interest rates can increase incentives of asset and risk managers in financial institutions for "search for profit" and thus to substantially increase risk taking; low reference interest rates increase interest margins (they can increase the value of collateral) and to increase the value of financial companies, thus increasing their capacity for higher leverage and risk taking; although desired in view of establishing credibility and a strong nominal anchor, a predictable monetary policy can reduce uncertainty and encourage financial managers (institutions) to underestimate risk; monetary policy, with "cleaning" of financial collapses via lowering the reference interest rate (Greenspan put), leads to: moral hazard, where financial institutions expect the central bank to save them from bad investments; increased systemic risk, when a number of large financial companies have disturbances which stimulates them to conduct similar investment strategies.
4)
The reference interest rate is a weak and inefficient tool for handling increased leverage, 
5)
A false dichotomy between monetary policy and the financial stability policy (see Mishkin, 2010; Hannoun, 2012) . Monetary policy and financial stability are crucially related and hence the dichotomy between the two is false. As seen, monetary policy can affect strongly the financial stability, while macroprudential policies for promoting financial stability will affect monetary policy, e.g. if interest rates are kept low, there is a possibility of rising risk of forming of a credit bubble. In such case, tightening macrodprudential policies can help prevent the bubble. Therefore, it is important to note that the coordination of monetary and macroprudent policy is of special importance if we wish to achieve all three goals -price, financial and economic stability.
6)
Monetary policy should take into account the macro-financial stability, and not only the price (see Blanchard, 2009 ; Moghadam, 2009; IMF, 2010) . The global crisis triggered the need for monetary decisions to be based on a framework which incorporates long-term implications of the expected booms (specific markets bubbles) for inflation and economic growth. Inflation remains the main goal of monetary policy. However, policy creators should pay more attention to asset price movements, credit expansions, leverage and systemic risk . When the systemic risk can cause adverse effects on the economy, and the financial regulation is not capable to fully prevent that from happening, monetary policy can play an active role. However, the risk of diminishing credibility in the fight against inflation will be larger and this is a similar argument to the one that caused the division of monetary and supervisory authorities. Hence, financial stability (or more directly asset price stability) should not be an explicit target of monetary policy. The monetary authorities can instead take into account the effect of their decisions on asset prices, on financial stability and on the 1 The tightened monetary conditions in the EU did not prevent European banks to invest in mortgage securities in the USA or to aggressively lend in foreign currencies to East-European banks and households.
response of regulation/supervision, only by the extent of their influence on inflation and growth in the long run, similar to the way they take into account the effect of interest rates on the fiscal balance and the monetary policy reaction. Considering the limitations of monetary policy, the burden of preventing credit booms should firstly fall on flexible prudent and supervisory policies in order to smooth the pro-cyclicality of financial intermediation. Prudent and administrative measures can provide more precise and rational (less costly) solutions than the changes in reference interest rate and they should be in the centre of the integrated policy response. Thus, prudent and supervisory policies will be more effective in handling the specific risks that accompany the boom (Caruana, 2009; IMF, 2010).
7)
The power: first, central banks will have a "softer" approach toward inflation, having in mind that rises in interest rates will have adverse effects on banks" balance sheets; second, the central bank will have a more complex mandate and in that case it would be less responsible and calculating. Both arguments deserve attention and point to the need for increasing the transparency of central banks, provided they get that function. If we look at the other option -division of these policies and the way that mechanism would work, we can realize that it is not providing higher efficiency of the instruments in times of crisis. create a perception that monetary policy cares more about economic stability than about price stability (due to which the approach is widely criticized). Hence, the decision for its implementation requires subdued inflation expectations and dedication to the nominal anchor. As can be seen from the elaborated lessons/implications, the global economic crisis showed that there is a need for redefining or expanding of certain parts of the existing monetary policy framework -to take into account the limits and efficiency of monetary policy, its role in the prevention and handling financial booms, its structure and cooperation with other economic policies, regulation and supervision, its goals and relation to the financial stability etc.
12) The Great

Lessons learned for fiscal policy
During the global crisis there were often demands for governments of many countries to actively use fiscal policy as a stimulus and a tool for handling the sharp fall of economic activity. However, risks that accompanies the increase of public debt further rise due to the low growth of potential GDP and higher interest rates, which can have further prolonged fiscal implications, especially if accompanied by a fall in employment. Higher interest rates additionally increase risks and implications, especially for countries with a large public debt burden or which plan to increase that burden.
During the few recent years a vast literature appeared on the lessons and implications regarding fiscal policy, resulting from the crisis and its importance strengthens considering that some authors divide the development of the economic crisis into three parts (crises) . This is one of the key lessons -to have enough fiscal space at disposal in order to use larger fiscal deficits when necessary. In order to back this lesson, let"s assume that Europe (and USA)
at the beginning of the crisis had low debt ratios, insignificant problems with demographic trends and with confidence in policy creators that they wouldn"t turn the temporary measures into permanent. In
that case, what would have prevented Europe (or any other country) to implement a much more expansionary fiscal packages? For example, China and Australia had a strong fiscal expansion, despite being only slightly affected by the crisis and the monetary policy was still able to react. This crisis shows first that the indebtedness target level should be lower than the one before the crisis. In this sense, in the next 10 or 20 years, when cyclical conditions allow, there should be a strong fiscal consolidation, while the recovery of economic growth should be mainly used to reduce the debt/GDP ratio, and not to finance increased public expenditures nor to reduce taxes. This can be supported with medium term fiscal frameworks, credible commitment to debt/GDP reduction, fiscal rues, avoidance of linking concrete public revenues to public expenditures, well designed budget process
etc. In addition we should note that strengthening fiscal frameworks, in particular fiscal rules, has fiscal rules are increasingly complex as they combine the objectives of sustainability and with the need for flexibility in response to shocks.
3)
4)
Unsustainable long term fiscal deficits ultimately lead to default (fiscal crises, crowding out and asymmetric growth, limitations of discretionary stimuli). Unsustainable fiscal deficits could cause a fiscal crisis, even in developed countries (e.g. European countries), which points to the general lesson that deficits are much more significant in the long run than previously thought to be (see more Blanchard et al., 2012 , IMF, 2009 ). Thus far it has not been very believable that markets could turn on stable, developed economies, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland etc. Now it is clear that fiscal crises happen in economies only when it becomes clear to the markets that the budget deficits are completely unsustainable and that there is a clear unpreparedness or inability of policy creators to handle the situation. It is worth to mention here the focus of economists on the link between rising indebtedness, growth of interest rates and crowding out of the private sector. Although the crowding out effect has been extensively documented in the economic literature, it should be pointed that it is often forgotten that extensive public borrowing can harm the economy even if there are enough capital inflows to keep low interest rates. The final general consequence of permanent budget deficits, which can be clearly seen in the recent crisis, is the limitations that countries face to react in times of recessions.
5)
Fiscal policy can help reduce/shorten the speculative episodes and handle their consequences in the aftermath. Fiscal buffers should be created in "normal times", while a welldesigned fiscal framework based on rules can strengthen this fiscal position, which is especially important when the significant growth of asset prices by a temporary increase in tax revenues can hinder the shaky fiscal position. Beside, on aggregate level, fiscal policy, through reducing demand pressures, can alleviate booms and reduce the shock sensitivity of the economy (Blanshard, 2009).
6)
Changes in fiscal policy have significant short term effects. There was a widespread consensus before the crisis among macroeconomists and policy creators that short term stabilization belongs almost exclusively to monetary policy. Monetary policy is flexible, easily isolated from political pressures, conducted mostly by experts, the zero bound interest rate presents no serious problem and monetary policy has other tools at its disposal. However, the global crisis proved that this view is largely wrong (Blanchard, et al., 2012) . 
7)
The tax structure impacts the increase of leverage and the sensitivity of the private sector to shocks. Thus, although tax distortions are not direct causes of the crisis, they can strongly influence the rise of leverage (Blanshard, 2009). Although changes in the tax framework are still at the beginning in many countries, there are no notable larger changes in the tendency to change the tax structure, aimed at supporting the high level of indebtedness of households and businesses (including the financial sector). Regulations, e.g. the ones that refer to reducing the tax base for interest paid on mortgage, or interest that companies pay on newly issued debt, can technically be alleviated and leveled with other market regulations. This is a view and lesson that should be carefully taken into account and implemented considering the situation in the sectors being stimulated and the political pressures. However, once the economic recovery gets pace, this alternative should be seriously reviewed.
8)
Designing better automatic fiscal stabilizers is of extreme importance (Blanchard et al., 2010; Furceri and Mourougane, 2009; IMF, 2009 ). The specifics of the global crisis and its effects were a challenge for discretionary fiscal policy, which in many cases came a moment too late to handle the recession or its effects were mixed. The dilemmas and problems opened by fiscal discretionary measures were large enough reason to pay more attention to automatic stabilizers in the new fiscal framework. In this case our focus should be aimed at two types of automatic stabilizers (see Claessens et al., 2010 ): 2 genuine automatic stabilizers, which by their nature imply a reduction in transfers or increase in tax revenues; and rules that allow for some transfers and taxes to vary on basis of previously specified triggers, related to the economic cycle. To achieve larger macroeconomic effects, the reforms in the first group of automatic stabilizers can be aimed at increasing the role of the state, larger progressivity of taxes or more generous social programs. Having in mind the causes and consequences of the global crisis, for fiscal policies more interesting is the second group of stabilizers, ones not related to complicated procedures, large costs as the first group, and which can be implemented on both public expenditures and public revenues (taxes) sides with large multipliers.
Regarding taxes, they can target low income households (variants of tax discount, percentage reduction of the tax obligation etc.) or companies (tax relief determined by the cycle). Regarding expenditures, temporary transfers can be aimed at low income households or households facing other problems, according to previously defined thresholds of certain economic variables (GDP, unemployment, disposable income etc.).
9)
The quick implementation of austerity programs is often counter-productive. In this sense, there is need for back-loaded austerity policies (see more Romer, 2012; Leigh et al., 2010). Since fiscal consolidation has strong contractionary effects in the short run, a quick implementation of austerity programs will make more difficult or even impossible achieving budget progress. Thus, a sharp reduction of public expenditures and rise in taxes in countries with high unemployment rates will likely do more harm than good. A look at the data on European countries implementing austerity measures shows that almost all experienced a rise in unemployment and negative forecast for their future growth and a rising debt ratio. Adding the political reactions to these policies, especially in countries with high unemployment rates, and the possibility of hysteresis effect, the arguments against the quick implementation of austerity programs and consolidation further strengthen. Their optimal response would be to adopt a plan for deficit reduction and to reduce public spending and increase taxes in phases -gradually (for which someone will inevitably pay the political cost). Facing problems such as reducing the power of monopolies, tax policy reform and its unification, improvement of the business climate and reducing the restrictions, enhancing the flexibility and productivity of labour markets, the long run economic growth will undoubtedly be higher. Since economic growth is essential for fiscal health, structural reforms are important for the long run solvency (Blanchard, et al., 2012 ). Yet, structural reforms should not be considered as substitutes for expansionary fiscal policy in stimulating aggregate demand (in the short run), nor as complementaries to consolidation policies, but as their partial substitutes. 14) The characteristics and factors of the political economy are especially important (see more Romer, 2011 
10)
Conclusion
Before the global economic crisis, there was a widespread agreement among economists that short-term economic stabilization should be in the hands of monetary authorities, mostly because of one of these reasons: skepticism surrounding the effects of fiscal policies based on the Ricardian equivalence arguments; if the monetary policy provides output stability, where is the role for fiscal policy?; the long lags in fiscal policy implementation and the political restrictions. This crisis caused, on one hand, the discovery of monetary policy limits, its redesign through implementation of various unconventional measures, and on the other hand, an increased significance of expansionary fiscal policies, especially in economies with sufficient fiscal space, and their role in stimulating economic activity, since the long duration of the crisis gives enough time for fiscal policy to achieve its goals.
Macroeconomic policy brought to attention the failures of the pre-crisis macroeconomic policy framework, forcing policy creators to employ new policies during the crisis and to think about a new redesigned macroeconomic policy framework. The ultimate aim of macroeconomic policy does not change -a stable output and stable inflation. However, the Great Recession proved that policy creators should follow more indicators (output structure, asset prices, systemic risk, leverage etc.) and that they have at their disposal more instruments than thought before the crisis. The global crisis also reveal that in many cases microprudential supervision failed to provide sufficient levels of capital and liquidity for financial institutions, in order to successfully deal with the shock. The effectiveness of monetary policy in dealing with systematic financial risk in terms of stable inflation, initiated a wide debate. In this respect, the present crisis has underlined the need to transcend/surpass the purely micro founded approach to financial regulation and supervision and to point out the need for significant attention to be put on the development and defining the element of macroeconomic policy for financial stability.
Our critical analysis points out 15 lessons for monetary policy which the monetary authorities should take into account in the process of designing their response to future crisis, among which: the dilemma "lean vs. clean", the zero bound effects, the impact of monetary policy on undertaking risk in the economy, the limits and efficiency of monetary policy, its role in preventing and handling financial booms, the dichotomy between monetary policy and policy for financial stability etc. The analysis also includes 14 lessons as a guide for governments to design their fiscal policy during future global imbalances, addressing the efficiency of fiscal policies during large-scale economic crises, the role and significance of fiscal space, the effectiveness of austerity programs, the coordination of fiscal policies on a global level, the coordination and interactions with monetary policy etc. The results of this study, especially the provided redesigned framework can serve as a reminder for the economists and economic policy creators to discuss, elaborate and analyze the lessons learned from the latest economic crisis in order to address future similar challenges more efficiently.
One of the benefits from such an analysis of the learned lessons and bases for redesigning the global framework of the key macroeconomic policies allowed us to make an adequate analysis and elaboration of the direction for economic theory and policy to be on in the future.
The analysis of the key lessons for monetary and fiscal policy indicated a change in "tastes" in the macroeconomic mix on a global level. Such questions always attract a wide interest and lead economists from different proveniences to strong debates about who was more right and which theory and policy should withdraw from its standpoint. Yet economists from all macroeconomic conceptions should admit that they were caught in a "headlock" and that no conception predicted clearly the incoming global storm nor managed to offer timely, concrete and efficient solutions to the problems.
Despite the thorough analyses, studies and books, there is still a considerable amount of uncertainty about the future path of the economic science after the global crisis. The crisis did not give rise to a new economist or a new macroeconomic concept with a concrete platform for formulation of economic policies, in order to improve the economic reality and handle the new challenges imposed by the Global crisis. However, the analysis points to a switch of forces on the macroeconomic scene and to a reminder of the significant rol of government intervention ( more Keynesian) in handling economic crises. Thus, if we remind ourselves about the alerts for the need for a combination of several macroeconomic conceptions and policies in order to successfully handle the challenges that appear in each separate situation, we come to the conclusion that again economic science in the future will be based on a mix of the dominant macroeconomic theories.
